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We provide an analysis of a new family of device independent quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols with several novel features: (a) The bits used for the secret key do not come from the
results of the measurements on an entangled state but from the choices of settings; (b) Instead of
a single security parameter (a violation of some Bell inequality) a set of them is used to estimate
the level of trust in the secrecy of the key. The main advantage of these protocols is a smaller
vulnerability to imperfect random number generators made possible by feature (a). We prove the
security and the robustness of such protocols. We show that using our method it is possible to
construct a QKD protocol which retains its security even if the source of randomness used by
communicating parties is strongly biased. As a proof of principle, an explicit example of a protocol
based on the Hardy’s paradox is presented. Moreover, in the noiseless case, the protocol is secure in
a natural way against any type of memory attack, and thus allows to reuse the device in subsequent
rounds. We also analyse the robustness of the protocol using semi-definite programming methods.
Finally, we present a post-processing method, and observe a paradoxical property that rejecting
some random part of the private data can increase the key rate of the protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn, 03.65.Ud
Keywords: Device-independent security, Hardy’s paradox, Quantum key distribution, Semi-definite program-
ming
I. INTRODUCTION
Developments in quantum mechanics lead to emer-
gence of many new research areas including quantum
cryptography[1], and quantum computation [2]. The goal
of quantum information theory is to develop new tech-
nologies for information processing that will take us from
the traditional classical information age into the age of
quantum information. Quantum key distribution [3], the
most secure known way for sending secret messages, is a
significant achievement in the field of cryptography. It’s
techniques allow Alice and Bob to establish a shared se-
cret key using an insecure quantum channel and public
communication.
Besides the validity of the laws of quantum physics,
the security of all QKD schemes relies on some other as-
sumptions. The foremost among them, always present
in any such protocol, is that all parties concerned have
secure laboratories, i.e., at no stage should there be a
leakage of secure classical data from any laboratory. This
assumption is crucial and cannot be removed. Another
basic assumption is that all players have complete con-
trol over their own physical devices, i.e., they have full
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knowledge over what quantum system their apparatuses
use and they also know the exact operation of their mea-
suring devices, etc. The goal of the device-independent
[4] analysis of quantum protocols is to eliminate the lat-
ter assumption, viz. players can distrust the source of
particles and they can also distrust their measuring appa-
ratuses as they might have been prepared by a malicious
party.
In 2007, Ac´ın et al. [5], introduced a device inde-
pendent QKD protocol secure against collective attacks.
Earlier questions of a similar type were also addressed
by several researchers in different contexts [6–8]. In
2011, Masanes et al. [9] provided a more general secu-
rity scheme based on causally independent measurement
processes. The security of all these protocols is under-
mined as the measurement at any step may depend on
the classical or quantum memory of all previous inputs
and outputs. Recently secure protocols where device re-
use is allowed were introduced [10, 11].
In all protocols mentioned above, the parties make
measurements on entangled subsystems, check for a vi-
olation of some Bell inequality to see if their outcomes
are random from the eavesdropper’s point of view and,
if indeed they are, use them as their secret key. In this
manuscript we present a family of protocols which are sig-
nificantly different. The parties announce their outcomes
and use their choices of measurement settings for key gen-
eration. Our protocol shares this property with the non-
device-independent prepare-and-measure SARG04[12].
2The potential benefit of flipping the roles of outcomes
and settings is that the latter are chosen by the parties
using their random number generators (RNGs), which
are typically assumed to be perfect, while the former are
obtained from measurements on the systems supplied by
the eavesdropper. It was shown that even small imper-
fectness in RNGs are a big threat to QKD [13, 14]. We
demonstrate that they are much a bigger threat to the
protocols where the key is obtained from the outcomes
than from the settings. More precisely, we take a stan-
dard device independent QKD and show that it cannot
be secure if the bias of RNGs is greater than 0.1 while
our protocol allows for positive key rates far beyond this
point. This is the main motivation of our approach.
Obviously, the parties need a way to convince them-
selves that the correlations they share cannot be classical.
Checking for a violation of a Bell inequality is only one
possible way of doing so. Another option is to e.g. ver-
ify the so-called Hardy’s paradox [15, 16]. There, more
than a single security parameter is estimated, which gives
the parties more knowledge about the correlations they
share. In [17–19] this approach has been used to improve
the rate of certified randomness.
The main result of this paper is the presentation of a
protocol which remains secure, even if the source of ran-
domness used by the parties is strongly biased. Besides
that, the protocol serves as a proof of principle that one
can use the bits from private random number generators
as a key for the device independent QKD. It is shown
how a protocol with these properties can be constructed
and how its security can be proven. These features may
be exploited by some future protocols.
We generalize the results of [9] stating that a condition
imposed on a single Bell inequality may certify the ran-
domness of the outcomes. Here we consider the case when
there are many parameters used, and the key is formed
from the measurement settings with the outcomes made
public. What is more, we show that this intrinsically
many-valued estimation can be as simple to conduct ex-
perimentally, as the standard Bell scenario.
Apart from proving the security of such protocols, we
provide a way of using semi-definite programming relax-
ations to evaluate their key rates. We give explicit numer-
ical results for a protocol basing on the original Hardy’s
paradox.
A. Organization of the paper
The organization of our paper is as follows.
We start in Sec. II with recapitulation of the original
Hardy’s paradox, show the uniqueness of the Hardy state
(Sec. II A), then we describe a QKD protocol and show
that in the perfect case it allows for reusing the devices
(Sec. II B).
In Sec. III we present the main motivation of the paper
by discussing the case when the distribution of settings
is biased, and compare the presented protocol with other
[9] QKD schemes.
We develop methods that allow to analyze the intro-
duced family of protocols when the measurements are
causally independent in Sec. IV. In Sec. IVA we describe
the notation used in the analysis, and in Sec. IVB the
system configuration. Sec. IVC discusses the definition
of the guessing probability of a measurement setting.
The following Sec. V presents a method of evaluation of
the guessing probability of a measurement setting using
semi-definite programming.
Sec. VI discusses the methods of evaluating robustness
of the protocol and describes several strategies of post-
processing that allow to increase the privacy.
The key rates obtained for these strategies are evalu-
ated, again using semi-definite programming, for the case
of Hardy’s paradox, in Sec. VII.
II. HARDY’S PARADOX AND QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
In this section we introduce the Hardy’s paradox[15],
and describe a quantum key distribution protocol based
on it.
Consider a physical system consisting of two subsys-
tems shared between two distant parties. The two ob-
servers (Alice and Bob) have access to one subsystem
each. Both can choose one of two binary measurement
settings labeled 0 and 1, with outcomes 0 and 1. The
settings are chosen at random in subsequent runs of the
experiment. Settings are denoted by letters A and B,
while outcomes by a and b, for Alice and Bob respec-
tively.
A. The Hardy’s state
The Hardy-type argument starts with the following set
of four joint probability conditions for two two-level sys-
tems:
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 0) ≡ q > 0,
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 0) = 0,
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 1) = 0,
P (a = 1, b = 1|A = 1, B = 1) = 0.
(1)
Let us find the set of states ρ for which the conditions of
the Hardy-type argument given in (1) are satisfied for a
given pair of observables. Let us denote the eigenstates
of the observable P = 0(1) by | 0〉P (| 0′〉P ) and | 1〉P
(| 1′〉P ) for the outcome 0 and 1 respectively. We now
associate a product state with every condition in the test
(1), say:
|φ3〉 = | 0〉A| 0〉B,
|φ2〉 = | 0′〉A| 0〉B,
|φ1〉 = | 0〉A| 0′〉B,
|φ0〉 = | 1′〉A| 1′〉B.
(2)
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| 0′〉P ≡ αP | 0〉P + βP | 1〉P , and
| 1′〉P ≡ β∗P | 0〉P − α∗P | 1〉P ,
(3)
where |αP |2 + |βP |2 = 1 and 0 < |αP | < 1 for X = A,B.
The last condition is due to the non-commutativity of
X = 0 and X = 1.
Let S be the subspace spanned by the three linearly
independent states |φ0〉, |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 given in (2). To
satisfy the conditions given in (1), ρ has to be confined
to a subspace S⊥ of C2 ⊗ C2, which is orthogonal to S
but not orthogonal to |φ3〉. The dimension of S⊥ is one.
Therefore, ρ must be an unique (up to a local unitary)
pure two-qubit entangled state, which we denote |ψH〉.
Thus, no mixed state of two spin-1/2 particles will sat-
isfy Hardy’s argument [20]. It can also be shown that
no two maximally entangled qubit states satisfy Hardy’s
argument [15].
The four product states {|φi〉}3i=0 are linearly inde-
pendent, hence, by the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
procedure, one can find an orthonormal basis {|φ′i〉}3i=0,
in which state |φ′3〉 = |ψH〉 is its last member:
|φ′0〉 = |φ0〉,
|φ′i〉 =
|φi〉 −
∑i−1
j=0〈φ′j |φi〉|φ′j〉√
1−∑i−1j=0 |〈φ′j |φi〉|2 , for i = 1, 2, 3.
(4)
The probability q in conditions (1), for the Hardy state,
|ψH〉, reads
q = |〈ψH |φ3〉|2 = 1−
2∑
i=0
|〈φ′i|φ3〉|2 =
|αAαB|2|βAβB|2
1− |αAαB|2 .
Its maximum is 5
√
5−11
2 for |αA| = |αB| =
√√
5−1
2 [21].
B. The protocol
We consider a scenario in which two distant parties,
Alice and Bob, want to generate a secure key. They are
allowed to use public classical communication. The QKD
protocol proceeds as follows:
• S1. In the initial phase of the protocol, the two
parties obtain pairs of entangled qubits. In each
round one of the qubits from each pair is given to
Alice, and the other to Bob. Each pair is called a
subsystem.
• S2. Alice randomly chooses whether to measure
A = 0, or A = 1 on each of her qubits. Bob does the
same by choosing randomly between measurements
of B = 0 and B = 1. Parties repeat such measure-
ments on all subsystems, and collect statistics. In
each run, labeled by i, they write down the chosen
observables, Ai and Bi respectively, together with
the obtained results, ai and bi.
• S3. Check for eavesdropping: For some randomly
selected runs, Alice and Bob both announce their
measurement choices (Ai and Bi) and the corre-
sponding outcomes (ai and bi). Alice and Bob
publicly compare their announced measurement
choices in order to estimate security parameters.
For this reason this phase is called the estimation
phase.
• S4. For the remaining runs, Alice and Bob an-
nounce only their measurement outcomes, not their
bases. Next, to generate their key, they select only
those runs for which both of them got outcome 0.
(Alice and Bob ignore those unrevealed pairs that
do not have outcomes on both sides equal to 0, so
they are working on some subset of the states.)
• S5. For each run with outcomes 0, they assign a
bit value according to their settings.
If the pairs of entangled qubits emitted by the
shared source are all perfect copies of the two-qubit
‘Hardy’ states |ψH〉 given by Eqs (4) the assigned
bit values will be perfectly correlated due to (1).
That is, in the ideal case they generate the same
key. In the noisy case, key reconciliation is re-
quired.
Device-independent approach allows to quantify all possi-
ble interventions of the eavesdropper. These may include
influencing the internal working of the devices used by
Alice and Bob, e.g. by establishing any type of corre-
lation, by coupling to the state, by emitting a different
state, or by using measurement settings different from
those specified by the protocol.
As mentioned earlier, the ideal Hardy test (1) for max-
imum probability of success q = 5
√
5−11
2 is fully device-
independent [22] - there is a unique quantum probability
distribution associated with this value. The conditions
(1) assure that both parties got outcome 0 only if they
have chosen the same measurement basis. Then we have
0 < P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 0) = 5
√
5− 11
2
< P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 1) =
√
5− 2
for a given set of observables and the choice of observ-
able on each side is fully random. The protocol is se-
cure against the most general form of collective memory
attacks. Unfortunately this case requires perfect experi-
mental data which is not possible to obtain in practice.
The remaining part of this paper analyzes the noisy case.
III. BIASED SOURCES OF RANDOMNESS
Before we move to the detailed analysis of the proto-
col in the case with imperfect experimental data let us
present the main motivation of this approach. To this end
we will compare the robustness to compromised random
4number generators in our protocol and the standard one
based on CHSH inequality. In both cases we assume that
the observed data corresponds to what an experimenter
would expect from perfect states and devices.
A common assumption in QKD states that the source
of randomness is perfect, meaning that settings are i.i.d.
with a probability distribution defined by numbers
Pperfect(A,B) =
(P (0, 0) = pA · pB, P (0, 1) = pA · (1− pB),
P (1, 0) = (1− pA) · pB, P (1, 1) = (1− pA) · (1 − pB))
(5)
with pA = pB =
1
2 for the uniform probability distribu-
tion. In Sec. VII B 2 we introduce a nonuniform proba-
bility distribution with and with pA = pB =
1
2 (
√
5− 1).
In this section we consider the case in which the aver-
age probability distribution of the source of randomness
is given by Eq. (5), but in particular runs, the probabil-
ity distribution is biased in a way known to eavesdropper.
For the sake of simplicity we consider biases modeled by
changing the parameters pA and pB to pA± ǫ and pB± ǫ,
respectively, for given ǫ, which gives four possible biased
distributions, (Pbiased,i(A,B))i=1,2,3,4.
It is easy to see that the average distribution (5) can be
obtained only if the proportions of all biased distributions
in the total number of runs are equal.
Note that if we know only the average distribution
given by Eq. (5), then for runs with a particular
biased distribution Pbiased,i(A,B), the observed condi-
tional probabilities are under- or overestimated, viz.
Pobserved(a, b|A,B) = Pactual(a, b|A,B)Pbiased,i(A,B)
Pperfect(A,B)
.
(6)
Let us consider the case without noise described by Eq.
(1) with
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 0) = q = 5
√
5− 11
2
,
and thus with
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 1) = q˜ =
√
5− 2, (7)
and with nonuniform distribution of settings. Then, for a
given biased distribution Pbiased,i(A,B), the probability
that the generated key is 0, Pi,key=0and is given by (cf.
Eq. (14a))
Pi,key=0 ≡ qPbiased,i(0, 0)
qPbiased,i(0, 0) + q˜Pbiased,i(1, 1)
.
The guessing probability is given by Pguess,i =
max(Pi,key=0, 1 − Pi,key=0), since the eavesdropper tries
to guess the more probable key value. To obtain the
average guessing probability this expression has to be
averaged over all four possible biased probability distri-
butions, namely
4∑
i=1
1
4
Pguess,i. (8)
Guessing probabilities for different ǫ with nonuniform dis-
tribution of settings are shown in Fig. 1.
In order to compare the efficiency of the presented pro-
tocol with other QKD protocols, we use the method of
[23, 24] to evaluate the guessing probability of the out-
comes of Alice certified by the maximal violation the
CHSH inequality with uniform, but biased, distribution
of settings. We consider the bound on the guessing prob-
ability implied by the observed value of 2
√
2 of the fol-
lowing expression
4 (Pbiased,i(0, 0)C(0, 0) + Pbiased,i(0, 1)C(0, 1) +
Pbiased,i(1, 0)C(1, 0)− Pbiased,i(1, 1)C(1, 1)) ,
where 4 is the inverse of the uniform probability of each
pair of settings in the distribution were unbiased, and
C(A,B) is the correlation between outcomes, when the
pair of settings A and B is chosen,
C(A,B) ≡ P (0, 0|A,B)− P (0, 1|A,B)
− P (1, 0|A,B) + P (1, 1|A,B).
Similarly as in the case of the Hardy protocol, the guess-
ing probability has to be averaged over cases with dif-
ferent biases. The results are shown in fig. 1. We see
that for ǫ ≈ 110 the Hardy protocol is still able to work,
whereas the CHSH protocol gives zero key rate.
IV. METHODS FOR ANALYSIS OF QUANTUM
KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS BASED ON
HARDY-LIKE PARADOXES
Below we describe the notation used within this paper,
the arrangement used in the analysis of the QKD, and
give more details about the phases of the QKD protocol.
For the sake of simplicity we consider here a case with
perfect RNGs. This can be extended in a natural way to
the case with biased probability distributions.
A. Notation and arrangement
In the perfect case, we can use the uniqueness of the
Hardy state to protect against the collective memory at-
tacks, whereas if the noise occurs we need to assume
that the measurements are causally independent, mean-
ing that their operators commute. This is justified by
the no-signaling principle if we use many spatially sepa-
rated measuring devices and perform the measurements
on all emitted pairs simultaneously, or if we use a single
measuring device that does not have a memory.
We treat successively emitted pairs of particles as sep-
arated subsystems. These subsystems together with the
subsystem of Eve form one system. We assume that the
order of the subsystems is irrelevant.
Let L0 be a set of labels of pairs of Alice’s and Bob’s
subsystems. For l ∈ L0 we denote the Hilbert space
of the relevant subsystems of Alice and Bob by HAl and
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FIG. 1. (Color on-line) Comparison of guessing probabilities of key values certified with the protocols using Hardy paradox
and CHSH inequality in case when the distribution of settings is biased. ǫ refers to the bias defined in Sec. III.
HBl , respectively. The subsystem of Eve lives on a Hilbert
space HE . We assume that all spaces are finite dimen-
sional. The Hilbert space of the whole system is
H ≡ HE ⊗
∏
l∈L0
HAl ⊗HBl . (9)
Vectors on HE are denoted by | e〉E , and on HPl for P ∈
{A,B} by | e〉Pl .
For every pair of subsystems both Alice and Bob per-
form one of the two measurements, each labeled by either
0 or 1. The measurements are binary POVMs denoted
by M˜Pl,X,x, where P ∈ {A,B} denotes the party, l ∈ L0
denotes the pair of subsystems, X ∈ {0, 1} denotes the
party’s setting, and x ∈ {0, 1} denotes the outcome. The
measuring operator M˜Pl,X,x acts on HPl .
The natural extension of the operator M˜Pl,X,x to the
space H is denoted by MPl,X,x, and acts with identity op-
erators on spaces different toHPl . From the construction,
MP1l1,X1,x1 commutes with M
P2
l2,X2,x2
if P1 6= P2 or l1 6= l2.
Recall that l ∈ L0, and we denote by al and bl the out-
comes, and by Al and Bl the settings, of Alice and Bob,
respectively.
Let SE be an arbitrary set, and {| e〉E}e∈SE be a set of
orthogonal states on HE . Without any loss of generality,
we assume the concerning state in the device independent
scenario is of the following form:
|Φ〉ABE ≡
∑
e∈SE
ce|φe〉, (10)
with ce ∈ C,
∑
e∈SE |ce|2 = 1, where
|φe〉 ≡ | e〉E ⊗
(∏
l∈L
| e〉Al ⊗ | e〉Bl
)
,
P ∈ {A,B}, l ∈ L0, and | e〉Pl is a state on HPl . Eve is
allowed to choose the state |Φ〉ABE , and the measuring
operators {MPl,X,x}.
For a subsystem l a conditional probability distribution
Pl(a, b|A,B) = (Pl(a, b|A,B))a,b,A,B can be defined by
Pl(a, b|A,B) ≡ Tr
(
M˜Al,a,AM˜
B
l,b,Bρl
)
, (11)
where ρl is the state obtained by tracing all other sub-
systems in (10).
Let us consider a family of sets of NB functionals,
{Hk}k=1,...,NB , acting on conditional probability distri-
butions of the form P(a, b|A,B) = (P (a, b|A,B))a,b,A,B
(thus Pl fits this form). These functionals are defined
by a set of values {αk,a,b,A,B}, with k = 1, . . . , NB,
a, b, A,B ∈ {0, 1}, and are linear combinations of con-
ditional probabilities of the form
Hk[P] =
∑
a,b,A,B
αk,a,b,A,BP (a, b|A,B). (12)
From the equation (1), it follows that, in the case of the
protocol using original Hardy’s paradox, α1,0,0,0,0 = 1,
α2,0,0,1,0 = −1, α3,0,0,0,1 = −1, α4,1,1,1,1 = −1 and the
remaining αk,a,b,A,Bs are equal to 0.
B. Setups of interest
The protocol presented in this paper is device inde-
pendent, since it relies only on the observed statistics.
The main aim is to show that it is possible to prove the
security of a key generated out of settings.
In order to illustrate what orders of key rates can be
expected to occur in real experiments, we refer to the
setup of each subsystem with Hardy’s measurements and
the following state
ρ(η) ≡ (1 − η)1
4
+ η|ψH〉〈ψH |. (13)
The observed statistics P(a, b|A,B) do not depend on
the distribution of settings, P(A,B), nevertheless the key
6rate does. We consider two distributions: uniform and
the one described in the section VIIB 2, referred further
as nonuniform.
An additional benefit of using nonuniform distribution
is the fact that it requires less randomness.
C. The guessing probability of a setting
Let us consider a particular subsystem l. We are in-
terested in conditional probabilities of Alice’s settings A,
when we know that both Alice and Bob got the outcome
0, namely P (A|a = 0, b = 0). These probabilities may be
expressed in terms of P(a, b|A,B) with use of the Bayes
rule, as
P (A = 0|a = 0, b = 0) = σ
σ + ν
, and (14a)
P (A = 1|a = 0, b = 0) = ν
σ + ν
, (14b)
where
σ ≡P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 0)P (A = 0, B = 0)+
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 1)P (A = 0, B = 1)
(15a)
ν ≡P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 0)P (A = 1, B = 0)+
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 1)P (A = 1, B = 1).
(15b)
Let h = (h1, · · · , hNB ) denote the values of functionals
defined by Eq. (12) over the probability distribution Pl
defined by Eq. (11), so that hk = Hk[Pl]. For the setup
of interest, (13), h is given by the following (cf. (1)):
h1 = ηq +
1− η
4
,
h2 = h3 = h4 =
1− η
4
.
(16)
Now, let us ignore the full knowledge about Pl, and
consider only the vector h. We introduce two functions,
Γ0(h) and Γ1(h), that give upper bounds for values of
Pl(A = 0|a = 0, b = 0) and Pl(A = 1|a = 0, b = 0),
respectively, allowed by quantum mechanics. Note, that
these functions do not depend on l, since they do not
make any assumptions about the state and the measure-
ments, so they give device-independent bounds. Exam-
ples of these functions for h given by Eq. (16) are shown
in Fig. 2.
V. SEMI-DEFINITE PROGRAMMING
RELAXATION OF THE GUESSING
PROBABILITY
This section describes how to use semi-definite pro-
gramming [25] methods to evaluate upper bounds for
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FIG. 2. (Color on-line) Functions Γ0(h) and Γ1(h) for uni-
form and nonuniform (see Sec. VIIB 2) distribution of set-
tings. These functions give upper bounds for values of
P (A = 0|a = 0, b = 0) and P (A = 1|a = 0, b = 0) for h
given by (16).
functions Γ0(h) and Γ1(h). Expressing them as a semi-
definite problem is desired, since such programs may be
efficiently treated numerically using the primal-dual in-
terior point algorithm [26, 27].
In [9] the authors have been able to use a hierarchy
of semi-definite programs from [23, 24], called NPA, to
find upper bounds for their case. It was possible because
they were interested in the probability of guessing the
outcome if the setting is known, P (a|A). These proba-
bilities appear directly in the semi-definite programs as
problem variables. In our case there is no variable cor-
responding to P (A|a, b), and therefore we have to find it
another way.
Let us consider a subsystem l. Without loss of gener-
ality, using no signaling principle, we may assume that
the eavesdropper performs her measurement with result
e before Alice and Bob start the protocol. This does not
reduce the generality of the attacks available to the eaves-
dropper [9]. Moreover, to consider probability distribu-
tions allowed for a particular subsystem l, we may trace
out other subsystems and perform optimization over bi-
partite states.
To use the NPA method, we introduce functions Γ˜0(h),
and Γ˜1(h), which give the relevant upper bounds on
P (A|a = 0, b = 0) assuming that the state under con-
sideration is pure. Then Γ0(h), and Γ1(h), are concave
hulls of Γ˜0(h), and Γ˜1(h), respectively.
We are interested in using the NPA hierarchy in order
to calculate Γ˜0(h). Since the expressions in (14a) and
(14b) are not linear in variables occurring in NPA, they
cannot by use neither as target, nor as constraint.
To overcome this difficulty, we notice that both σ and
ν in (15a) and (15b) are linear in NPA variables. In the
general case we need to perform the optimization in two
stages. In the first stage we impose the constraints given
by the vector h, which can be easily done in the NPA
7hierarchy and calculate the scope of the allowed values of
σ for given h. In the second stage we calculate the scope
of the allowed values of ν for given h and given value of σ,
for some grid of values. This way we obtain a boundary
of some region for which it is possible to evaluate the
bounds on both (14a) and (14b).
For Hardy’s paradox the optimization is much simpler.
In this case σ is a function of h. It is easy to see that the
expressions (14a) and (14b) achieve their maximal values,
if ν gets it’s minimal or maximal value, respectively.
Obviously calculating a function for all possible val-
ues of a continuous parameters is impossible. Instead we
calculate it only for some grid of values. Now, if we rep-
resent the function with set of vectors, each containing
the coordinates of a single point together with the value
of the function, then the problem of linearly constrained
optimization over this function can be solved with linear
programming. Examples of such problems are programs
stated in Eqs (17) and (18) further in this paper.
VI. EVALUATING KEY RATES AND
POST-PROCESSING STRATEGIES
Here we describe the method of evaluating the key rate
achieved by protocols based on Hardy-like paradoxes. We
also discuss some post-processing strategies that allow to
increase the key rate.
A. Basic case
In the simplest case described in Sec. II B, the best
thing the eavesdropper may do is to maximize his guess-
ing probability, namely P
(1)
guess(h). Subsystems can be di-
vided into two groups. For states within the first group,
the eavesdropper makes a guess that the key value is 0,
and for states from the second group, she guesses the key
value 1.
The probability that a subsystem belongs to the first
group is p0. The average values of the Bell observables
(12) (or statistics) from this group is given by h0, which
allows for guessing 0 by the eavesdropper with the prob-
ability upper bounded by Γ0(h0). The remaining part of
subsystems (with probability p1 = 1− p0) has the statis-
tics given by h1, and the eavesdropper guesses correctly
the key value 1 with probability not exceeding Γ1(h1).
The solution of the following program gives the rele-
vant upper bound for the average guessing probability:
maximize p0Γ0(h0) + p1Γ1(h1)
subject to p0h0 + p1h1 = h,
p0 + p1 = 1,
p0, p1 ≥ 0.
(17)
Solutions of this program for h given by (16) are shown
in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3. (Color on-line) Solutions of the program (17) for cases
with uniform and nonuniform (see Sec. VIIB 2) distribution
of settings.
The key rate is given by the following formula:
K1 = P (a = 0, b = 0)
(
− log2(P (1)guess(h))−H(A|B)
)
,
where both expressions, P (a = 0, b = 0) and the condi-
tional entropy H(A|B) can be evaluated from the setup.
Examples of conditional entropies for different setups
from sec. IVB and post-processing strategies, are shown
in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4. (Color on-line) Values of conditional entropies of the
setting of Alice given the setting of Bob, H(A|B), if outcomes
on both sides were equal to 0. The cases with uniform and
nonuniform distribution of settings, and with and without
dropping strategy, are considered. The η parameter refers to
the state given by Eq. (13). In the case with nonuniform
distribution, the line referring to use of dropping strategy is
slightly above the one without dropping.
8B. A dropping strategy
In a long sequence of N runs, the number of runs with
both outcomes equal to 0 is
n ≈ P (a = 0, b = 0) ·N.
Eve in p0 fraction of all runs tries to guess that the key
value is 0, and in p1 ≡ 1 − p0 part of the runs, that it
is 1. The former part of runs gives statistics h0, and the
latter h1. Since the observed statistics are given by h,
we have h = p0h0 + p1h1.
Let her success probability in each of these two cases
be denoted by P0 and P1, respectively.
Now, let us consider only those runs in which both
published outcomes were 0. Among them the number of
runs with the setting of Alice equal to 0 is
(p0P0 + p1(1− P1))n ≡ pA0 n,
and equal to 1 is
(p0(1− P0) + p1P1)n ≡ pA1 n.
If pA0 < p
A
1 , then Alice discards (or drops) (p
A
1 − pA0 ) ·
n runs with the value 1. After dropping she has equal
number of both values, namely pA0 · n of each. In this
situation Eve correctly guesses p0P0n of runs with the
value 0, and
pA
0
pA
1
p1P1n of runs with the value 1, so her
guessing probability (among those runs that were not
dropped) is given by
P (2)guess ≡
1
2pA0 n
(
p0P0n+
pA0
pA1
p1P1n
)
=
1
2
(
p0P0
pA0
+
p1P1
pA1
)
The case with pA0 > p
A
1 gives exactly the same formula.
To calculate P
(2)
guess(h) (as a function of h) via a linear
optimization, the values pA0 = P (A = 0|a = 0, b = 0),
and pA1 = P (A = 1|a = 0, b = 0) have to be calculated
from the setup. Then the bound on the guessing proba-
bility is given by the solution of the following program:
maximize
1
2
(
1
pA0
p0Γ0(h0) +
1
pA1
p1Γ1(h1)
)
subject to p0h0 + p1h1 = h,
p0 + p1 = 1,
p0, p1 ≥ 0.
(18)
The key rate is now given by the following formula:
K2 = P (a = 0, b = 0)(2min(p
A
0 , p
A
1 ))(
− log2(P (2)guess(h))−H(A|B, dropping)
)
Both expressions, P (a = 0, b = 0) and the conditional
entropyH(A|B, dropping) can be evaluated directly from
the setup.
VII. THE ROBUSTNESS OF QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS BASING ON
HARDY’S PARADOX
In this section the method described in Secs V and VI is
applied to the experimental setup described in the section
IVB. The resulting key rates are shown in Fig. 5.
A. Results
The numerical results concerning the obtained key
rates in different situations are shown in Fig. 5. The
optimal choice of the distribution of settings depends on
the value of the noise parameter η. Although the nonuni-
form distribution gives better key rates with lower noise,
the uniform distribution can be more robust.
In case of nonuniform distribution, the role of the drop-
ping strategy seems to be marginal. This is not surpris-
ing, since the aim of that distribution is to make the
number of values 0 and 1 more or less equal. Similar
results refers to conditional entropies (cf. Fig. 4).
A characteristic property of these protocols is the fact,
that the use of nonuniform distribution of settings not
only requires less randomness, but also in some cases
improves the key rate.
B. The case without noise
The analysis of the case without noise gives an insight
to the reason, why the use of the dropping strategy can
increase the key rate. It also explains the role of nonuni-
form distribution of settings.
1. The dropping strategy
In the perfect case with uniform distribution we have
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 0) = 5
√
5−11
2 ≈ 0.090167 and
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 1) = √5 − 2 ≈ 0.236068, so
P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 0) < P (a = 0, b = 0|A =
1, B = 1). Hence, the guessing probability for Eve is
higher than 12 . The following dropping strategy makes
the guessing probability equal to 12 .
After performing her measurements, Alice randomly
selects only P (a=0,b=0|A=0,B=0)
P (a=0,b=0|A=1,B=1) runs from the total runs
with a = b = 0, where her measurement settings was
A = 1 (in the perfect case, then also B = 1). Alice sends
the list of selected runs to Bob via a public channel.
For this reduced list (from which the key is generated)
of runs Alice have equal number of 0s and 1s. (In the per-
fect case they correspond to the same values on the side
of Bob.) Hence, the guessing probability is now exactly
equal to 12 .
9 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
 0  0.01  0.02
ke
yr
at
e 
[bi
t]
η
nonuniform, without dropping
nonuniform, with dropping
uniform, without dropping
uniform, with dropping
FIG. 5. (Color on-line) Comparison of key rates in different scenarios.
We have
Pnot dropped(a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B = 0)+
Pnot dropped(a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 1)
= 5
√
5− 11 ≈ 0.180334.
To get the actual ratio of runs that are contained in the
key, this should be multiplied by
P (A = B = 0) = P (A = B = 1) =
1
4
.
Thus the key rate is approximately 5
√
5−11
4 ≈ 0.04508.
2. Nonuniform distribution of settings
Instead of choosing measurement settings with equal
probabilities, both Alice and Bob may choose the ob-
servables A = 0 (resp. B = 0) and A = 1 (resp. B = 1)
with a ratio r : 1− r, for some r.
Let us denote for simplicity P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 0, B =
0) = x and P (a = 0, b = 0|A = 1, B = 1) = y. Then to
obtain guessing probability equal to 12 , the condition for
r is
xr2 = y(1− r)2, or equivalently (19a)
r =
√
y√
x+
√
y
. (19b)
The key rate is thus 2xr2 = 2x y
(
√
x+
√
y)2
.
In the perfect case x = 5
√
5−11
2 and y =
√
5− 2, so the
key rate is 2xr2 ≈ 0.06888. The ratio is r = 12
(√
5− 1) ≈
0.61803.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Our paper provides an example of an entirely new class
of QKD protocols and provides tools for their analysis.
We have presented a QKD protocol based on Hardy’s
paradox and analyzed its security in both ideal and noisy
scenarios. It has two novel features: (a) The bits used for
the secret key do not come from the results of the mea-
surements on an entangled state, but from the choices
of settings which are more difficult for an eavesdropper
to influence; (b) Instead of a single security parameter a
set of them is used to estimate the level of trust in the
secrecy of the key, or to construct a certifying observable.
We have shown that these two properties were not
chosen by accident. They both make the eavesdropping
harder, leading to protocols which can produce a positive
amount of shared key even if the biases of the source of
randomness are strong. Using more than a single param-
eter for security provides more information to the parties
about the correlations that they share and puts more
limits on the eavesdropping strategies.
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SDP was implemented in the free software package
GNU OCTAVE[28] using the SeDuMi[26, 27] toolbox.
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